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This paper aims at providing empirical evidence on the effect of capital flows on asset prices 
including its channel under different currency regimes, focusing on ten emerging and developing 
economies in the world with data availability and stationarity for the 2000s, by a generalized 
impulse response analysis under a vector auto-regression model. The main findings are as  
follows. Portfolio capital inflows have a significantly positive effect on stock prices in all sample 
economies except two transition economies, which implies that the direct channel from capital 
inflows into stock markets is at least working in sample economies regardless of their currency 
regimes; The indirect channel –the channel in which capital inflows raise share prices through 
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Capital Inflows and Asset prices: 
Empirical Evidence from Emerging and Developing Economies 
 
1. Introduction 
Capital flows to emerging and developing economies in the world have increased 
significantly since the 2000s. In particular, the emerging markets in Asia and Latin America have 
been marked by massive capital inflows because of their better economic fundamentals, higher 
growth prospects and their perceived under-valued domestic currencies against the US dollar. 
After the 2008 global financial crisis, the monetary easing in advanced economies and some 
expectation on their exits have been giving a great influence on capital inflows towards emerging 
markets and also capital outflows from them. In some cases, capital flows have become 
significantly high relative to the size of domestic capital markets with a potentially large direct 
impact on their asset prices. 
It has been believed that the capital inflows towards emerging and developing economies 
have been basically useful for raising their economic growth, and thus these economies have 
adopted policies to attract capital inflows. However, if substantial capital inflows, particularly 
portfolio investments are not managed in an appropriate manner, it might lead to financial risks 
such as boom-bust cycles resulting in a crisis for emerging and developing economies. Large 
capital inflows, for instance, may lead to excessive foreign borrowing and foreign currency 
exposure, possibly fueling domestic credit booms and asset bubbles. When capital flows reverse 
suddenly, however, a boom stage of credit expansion and asset price hikes may be turned into a 
bust stage, and the economies may finally suffer from serious financial and economic crisis. As a 
matter of fact, under these concerns on financial risks of massive capital inflows, some of 
emerging market economies, e.g. Korea, Indonesia, Thailand and Peru, have taken domestic 
prudential measures and even capital controls mainly on short-term capital transactions since 
2009. 
Caballero and Krishnamurthy (2006) provided theoretical insights on the nexus between 
capital inflows and asset bubbles in emerging market economies. They argued that emerging 
market economies present a fertile macroeconomic environment for the emergence of “bubbles 
dynamics”, since a shortage of stores of value, i.e. dynamic inefficiency, caused by the “financial 
repression” in their financial systems tends to create a space for bubbles on unproductive assets 
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to arise. They also proposed a set of aggregate risk management policies to alleviate the bubble-
risk, such as liquidity requirements on the banking system, sterilization of capital inflows and 
structural policies aimed at developing public debt markets. Aoki et al. (2009) further developed 
a framework to analyze “bubbles dynamics” focusing capital flows on international transaction 
of private debts and equities, and predicted that when the domestic financial system is 
underdeveloped, the economy experiences a short-run boom with capital inflow and asset price 
hikes after capital account liberalization, which is not sustainable in the long run. These 
theoretical frameworks tell us how important the issue on capital flows and asset prices is for 
emerging and developing economies. 
Related to the aforementioned theoretical consideration, there have been limited studies to 
empirically investigate the nexus between capital flows and asset prices, which focus mainly on 
Asian emerging economies. Kim and Yang (2009) represented empirical evidence on the impacts 
of capital inflows on asset prices in the case of Korea, using a vector auto-regression (VAR) 
model. They found that capital inflow shocks have contributed to the stock price increase, but 
not much to the increase in land prices due to a limited effect on the liquidity, and concluded that 
the influence of capital inflow shocks seems to be limited in other parts of the economy than 
stock markets, implying that the possibility of the boom–bust cycle is relatively low in Korea. 
Kim and Yang (2011) extended the analysis of Kim and Yang (2009) to those in Asian emerging 
economies, and found that capital inflows indeed have contributed to asset price appreciation in 
the region, but capital inflow shocks explain a relatively small part of asset price fluctuations. 
Tillmann (2012) also estimated the impact of capital inflows on house prices and equity prices in 
Asian emerging economies using panel VAR model for a post-2000 sample. The key findings 
were: first, capital inflow shocks significantly push up house and stock prices; second, capital 
inflow shocks account for twice the portion of overall asset price changes they explain in OECD 
countries, and third, cross-country difference in asset price responses to capital inflow shocks are 
not due to the heterogeneity of market characteristics and the use of macro-prudential policies 
but due to differences in the monetary policy response to the shocks. As far as the limited 
evidence above is concerned, the impacts of capital flows on asset prices are identified in Asian 
emerging economies in general, but the degree of them differ across economies according to e.g. 
their monetary policies. 
This paper helps to place the ongoing concerns on capital flows and asset prices in emerging 
and developing economies in the context of observed facts, and to enrich empirical evidence on 
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their relationship, which is strategically important in investigating whether the recent capital 
flows have been involved in bubble dynamics, i.e. boom-bust cycle in emerging and developing 
economies. To be specific, our analytical concerns for emerging and developing economies are 
whether capital flows are really responsible for recent fluctuations of asset prices; and if so, 
through which channels capital flows affect asset prices, directly by their demanding assets or 
indirectly through a change in money supply. Also it would be useful to know whether the 
effects of capital flows on asset prices differ under different currency regimes. In this analysis, 
we focus on the cases of emerging and developing economies in the world during the 2000s, i.e. 
the post 1990s-currency crisis period. As the empirical method to examine these issues, we 
estimate impulse responses of selected economic variables to capital flow shocks under a vector 
auto-regression (VAR) model. 
We contribute to the aforementioned literature in the following ways. First, while the 
literature has concentrated on Asian and emerging economies as analytical samples, we target all 
of emerging and developing economies in the world, which would be available for the VAR 
analyses. Second, we examine how the impacts of capital flows on asset prices vary according to 
currency regimes. The responses of monetary policies to capital flow shocks are supposed to be 
different under different currency regimes. In this sense, our study could be an analytical 
extension of Tillmann (2012) that emphasized on the heterogeneity of monetary policy responses 
to capital inflow shocks. 
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. The next section presents empirical analyses 
introducing analytical framework, data and methodology, and discussing the estimation results. 
The last section summarizes the results and concludes. 
 
2. Empirics 
This section conducts empirical estimation of the nexus between capital flows and asset 
prices. We first describe analytical framework, data, methodology and sample economies, and 
then discuss the estimate outcomes.  
 
2.1 Analytical Framework 
In examining the effect of capital inflows, particularly portfolio investment, on asset prices, 
we are concerned with its channels and its relationship with currency regime too. We then 
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assume the following two channels (see Diagram 1). One channel is that capital flows can 
directly affect the demand for assets, which can thus influence asset prices. For example, capital 
inflows to the stock market increase the demand for stocks, thereby causing the stock price hike. 
Another channel is an indirect one through a change in money supply under “pegged” currency 
regime. For instance, suppose that the US reduced its interest rate through her quantitative 
monetary easing (See Diagram 2). An emerging economy would suffer from its currency 
appreciation through capital inflows under its higher interest rate. If an economy adopted perfect 
“floating” currency regime, nothing might happen except for a direct channel above, since it 
would not intervene in its foreign exchange market and thus would change neither money supply 
nor liquidity. However, an emerging economy usually intervenes in the foreign exchange market 
regardless of its currency regime to avoid its currency fluctuations (the reason will be explained 
later), and it results in an accumulation of foreign reserves. It is at this stage where monetary 
policy responses vary according to its currency regime. Under a floating regime, an economy 
tries to sterilize its intervention to secure its monetary autonomy, thereby no change in money 
supply and liquidity occurring finally (its currency appreciation may reduce aggregate demands 
toward equilibrium following Diagram 2). On the contrary, under a pegged regime, an economy 
cannot help accommodating an increase in money supply and liquidity, which may then flow 
into asset markets and raise asset prices as a second channel. If an economy stood beyond a full-
employment output level, it might get a pressure of higher inflation or asset bubbles following 
Diagram 2. To sum up, it is supposed that pegged regime makes capital flows affect asset prices 
through both direct and indirect channels, while floating regime faces only a direct channel by 
cutting off an indirect channel from capital flows to domestic money supply through either 
nonintervention or sterilization. Following this analytical framework, we can examine how the 
impacts and channels of capital flows on asset prices differ according to currency regimes. 
The following two issues should be noted further, as long as emerging and developing 
economies are targeted. First, perfect floating currency regime is not feasible in emerging and 
developing economies. The loss of stability of exchange rate seems to be a hard choice to 
emerging and developing economies, since their economies are basically facing the problem of 
“fear of floating” (see Calvo and Reinhart; 2002). Their economies cannot escape from the 
constraint of “impossible trinity”: economies can pursue two of three options –fixed exchange 
rates, monetary autonomy and capital mobility. As long as some stability of exchange rate is 
required in their economies, they have to sacrifice monetary autonomy to some extent or at least 
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have to intervene in the foreign exchange market as managed floating regime. The alternative 
policy option would be to resort to a direct capital control, but its workability is the question. 
Ostry et al. (2010) argued that the evidence appears to be stronger for capital controls to have an 
effect on the composition of inflows rather than on the aggregate volume. 
The second point to be noted is why some emerging and developing economies have 
accumulated a lot of foreign reserves through their intervention, although they have allowed their 
currency fluctuations, whose phenomenon has come to be a puzzle for economists. Aizenman et 
al. (2008) explained this puzzle by the change in the role of foreign reserves. They argued that 
the recent literature has focused on their role as a means of self-insurance against exposure to 
volatile “hot money” subject to frequent sudden stops and reversals, whereas the earlier literature 
focused on the role of foreign reserves as a buffer stock for managing pegged exchange rate 
regimes. Obstfeld et al. (2008) constructed a financial-stability model to elucidate reserve 
holdings in the modern era of globalized capital markets, and proved that the size of domestic 
financial liabilities, financial openness and exchange rate policy are all significant predictors of 
international reserve stocks. 
 
2.2 Data and Methodology 
Under the above-mentioned analytical frameworks, we first identify economic variables for 
our VAR estimation. We focus them only on the following three variables: portfolio capital 
inflows (PFI), stock (share) prices (STP), monetary base (MOB) for the following reasons. First, 
we need to enlarge samples of emerging and developing economies in the world for our 
estimation by narrowing down the targeted variables. Second, we need to secure the degree of 
freedom in our VAR estimation within the limited range of time-series data, i.e., 44 quarters 
during the sample period from 2000 to 2010. PFI includes both “equity & investment fund 
shares” and “debt securities”, and shows “net” inward investment, i.e., portfolio investment in 
liabilities minus portfolio investment in assets.  PFI is expressed as a percentage ratio to GDP. 
STP is signified as index numbers (2005=100) in terms of period averages. MOB is expressed as 
a percentage ratio to GDP and as seasonally adjusted series by Census X12. Only for the 
observation of sample economies, we add a variable of foreign reserves (RES), which is also 
expressed as a percentage ratio to GDP. All the data for the economic variables above are 
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retrieved from the International Financial Statistics (IFS) of the International Monetary Fund 
(IMF).
1
  
We then construct the VAR model. VAR modeling is useful for identifying the effects of 
capital inflows on asset prices in case the variables are interrelated in the aforementioned two 
kinds of channels, and for inferring their dynamic effects. Kim and Yang (2009 and 2011) and 
Tillmann (2012), which were shown in the literature review, adopted a VAR model to investigate 
the contribution of capital inflows to asset price hikes in the case of Asian emerging economies. 
We basically follow their model, and apply it to our concern. We specify the VAR model in the 
following way: 
 
𝑦𝑡 =  𝜇 + 𝑉1𝑦𝑡−1 +  𝑉2 𝑦𝑡−2 +  𝜀𝑡                                                                              (1) 
 
where 𝑦𝑡 is a (3 × 1) column vector of the endogenous variables, 𝑦𝑡 =  (𝑑𝑃𝐹𝐼𝑡 𝑑𝑆𝑇𝑃𝑡 𝑑𝑀𝑂𝐵𝑡)
′, 
𝜇 is a (3 × 1) constant vector, each of 𝑉1 and 𝑉2 is a (3 × 3) coefficient matrix, each of 𝑦𝑡−1 and 
𝑦𝑡−2  is a (3 × 1) vector of the lag endogenous variables, and 𝜀𝑡  is a (3 × 1) vector of the 
random error terms in the system. The lag length, i.e., two quarters, is selected to capture 
dynamic interactions of the variables to the maximum extent under the constraint that we have to 
secure the degree of freedom within the limited range of time-series data, , i.e., 44 quarters. Each 
economic variable is shown in terms of first difference to make their time series data stationary 
while the levels of their data have usually a unit root, as are shown in the later section. 
Based on the VAR model (1), we examine the impulse responses of each variable to 
portfolio inflows shocks. It enables us to identify the aforementioned two channels from 
portfolio inflows towards asset prices hike: When we see significantly positive responses of 
share prices, if there are no responses in monetary base, it implies only a direct channel working; 
but if there are also significantly positive responses in monetary base, it suggests both of direct 
channel and indirect one working together. From the analytical framework above, we suppose 
that the economies with pegged currency regime could have the impacts of capital flows on asset 
prices through both of the channels, while those with floating regime could have the effects 
through only a direct channel. Regarding the methodology to define the impulse responses, we 
                                                             
1
 We basically use the IFS CD-ROM in April 2013, but link it with that in June 2011 in case that the former 
does not trace back the data well in some time-series variables. 
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adopt the “generalized impulse response” proposed by Pesarana and Shinb (1998). This approach, 
unlike the traditional impulse response analysis, does not require orthogonalization of shocks and 
is invariant to the ordering of the variables in the VAR model. By using this method, we trace 
four quarters (one year) to examine dynamic effects in accumulated terms.
2
 
 
2.3 Selection of Sample Economies 
We herein clarify the selection process of samples from emerging and developing economies 
in the world. The sample period is, as we mentioned, the one from the 1st quarter of 2000 to the 
4th quarter of 2010. The reason why we focus on the 2000s is that the 1990s include currency 
crises and changes in currency regime in many economies, and the 2000s have intensified capital 
flows to emerging market economies in line with financial integration. 
We take the following three steps for selecting sample economies. First, we sort out the 
samples by the data availability for three key variables, PFI, STP, and MOB (see Table 1) 
Among the 159 emerging and developing economies listed in IFS, it is only 23 economies in 
which the data for all three variables are available on quarterly basis during the sample period of 
the 2000s. 
Second, we examine each of 23 economies by its currency regime, and extract the 
economies without changes in regimes during the sample period by removing those with mixed 
regimes. For the classification of currency regimes, we use the “Exchange Rate Regime Reinhart 
and Rogoff Classification”.3   The IMF represents exchange rate arrangements of the Fund 
members. However, its classification is often criticized as the one that does not necessarily 
reflect actual exchange rate arrangements, since it is based on the details that Fund members 
formally announced. Many economists, therefore, have often shown their own analysis of the de 
facto exchange rate regimes. One of the famous and latest estimates is the Reinhart and Rogoff 
Classification above, which reclassified exchange rate regimes by employing newly compiled 
monthly data sets on market-determined exchange rates. Table 2 represents “Annual coarse 
classification” on the 23 economies for 2000-2010. We name the economies with any regime 
changes “Mixed”, those classified into 1 and 2 “Peg” and those classified into 3 and 4 “Float”.4 
                                                             
2
 The details of “generalized impulse response” are described in the EViews 7 Users’ Guide. 
3
 See http://www.carmenreinhart.com/data/browse-by-topic/topics/11/. 
4
 Russia has changed its regime in 2010, but is classified into “Peg” since we exclude 2010 from estimation 
later. 
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We can finally get 15 economies (8 of “Float” and 7 of “Peg) by removing 8 of “Mixed” (see 
again Table 1). 
As the final step, we investigate the stationary property of time-series data for the three 
variables in each of 15 samples by a unit root test for the VAR estimation later on. For a unit root 
test, the augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) test (Said & Dickey, 1984) and the Philips-Perron (PP) 
(Philips & Perron, 1988) test have often been used. It is well-known, however, that both the ADF 
and PP suffer from severe size and power problems depending on the nature of the process. 
Accordingly, Ng and Perron (2001) introduce a new unit root test, which uses detrended data and 
a lag selection procedure that improves on previous methods. This study, thus, adopts the Ng and 
Perron test on the null hypothesis that a level and/or a first deference of each variable have a unit 
root, by choosing to include “trend and intercept” in the test equation judging from data 
observation. This test constructs four test statistics that are based upon the detrended data. These 
test statistics are modified forms of Phillips and Perron and statistics (MZa, MZt), the Bhargava 
(1986) statistic (MSB), and the ERS Point Optimal statistic (MPT).
5
 Table 3 reports that for a 
level of data there are no economies in which the null hypothesis of a unit root is rejected for all 
three variables, and for a first difference there are 10 economies where the hypotheses is rejected 
for all three, among 15 economies. 
In all, we finally select 10 sample economies (6 of “Float” and 4 of “Peg”) for the VAR 
model estimation, which clear all the conditions: data availability, no changes in currency 
regimes, and data stationarity for the sample period (see Table 1 again). We herein take an 
overview on the 10 sample economies by graphing the three key data, PFI, STP and MOB, as 
well as foreign reserves, RES, in each economy. Figure 1 shows us that there appears to be very 
rough synchronization between capital inflow (PFI) and stock prices (STP) in sample economies 
except Croatia and Russia, and that there seems to be no clear relationship between capital 
inflow (PFI) and monetary base (MOB). An interesting fact is that as typically shown in 
Thailand there has been no increase in monetary base in spite of a rapid accumulation of foreign 
reserves, which implies the existence of sterilization of foreign exchange intervention. These 
rough observations will statistically tested by VAR model estimation in the following section. 
 
2.4  Discussion on Estimate Outcomes 
                                                             
5
 All the tests are described in details in the EViews 7 Users’ Guide. 
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We herein conduct VAR model estimation on three key variables: portfolio capital inflows 
(PFI), stock prices (STP) and monetary base (MOB), based on Equation (1) for ten selected 
sample economies during the 2000s in quarterly terms. The outcome of VAR estimation is 
shown in Appendix, and that of the estimation for generalized impulse responses to capital 
inflow (PFI) shocks in Table 4. Table 4 reports that stock prices positively respond to capital 
inflow shocks at more-than-90-percent significant levels within four quarters in all the sample 
economies but Croatia and Russia; monetary base positively respond to the shocks at the 
significant level simultaneously with stock price responses in India and Peru, which belong to 
pegged currency regime; significant response of monetary base to the shock in the third quarter 
in Indonesia appears after its stock price responses. 
We interpret the estimation outcomes above in the following ways. First, portfolio capital 
inflows have a significantly positive effect on stock prices in all sample economies except 
transition economies, which implies that the direct channel from capital inflows into stock 
markets is at least working in sample economies regardless of their currency regimes. In fact, the 
positive responses of stock prices to capital inflow shocks do not accompany any responses of 
monetary base to the shocks (even in Indonesia the monetary base response comes later than the 
stock price response) in the economies with floating currency regime. This effect means nothing 
but the direct channel in which capital inflows directly go into stock market, thereby raising 
stock prices. We speculate the reason for no significant responses of stock prices to capital 
inflows shocks in such transition economies as Croatia and Russia. In these economies, stock 
market may have not been well developed yet in their financial system. When we compare 
money multipliers, the index representing financial deepening, in the two transition economies 
with those in the other sample economies, the former are extremely lower than the latter (see 
rightest column in Table 4).  This may indirectly suggest the immature development in their 
stock market. 
Second, the indirect channel –the channel in which capital inflows raise share prices through 
an increase in domestic monetary base– seems to work differently under the sample economies 
with different currency regimes; it works in the economies with peg regime like India and Peru, 
whereas it does not in those with floating regime like Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Indonesia, Mexico 
and Thailand. In fact, it is only in India and Peru that the positive responses of monetary base to 
capital inflow shocks together with the positive response of stock prices are identified in our 
estimation. The stock price responses in India and Peru would be rather larger and more 
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persistent than those in the sample economies with floating regime. These findings appear to be 
consistent with Tillmann (2012) that attributed the cross-country difference in asset price 
responses to the heterogeneity of monetary policy responses. As we mentioned in the analytical 
framework, once emerging and developing economies face capital inflows and intervene in the 
foreign exchange market, the economies with pegged regime allow the intervention to lead to an 
increase in monetary base, which causes liquidity flows into stock market and a surge in stock 
prices, whereas those with floating regime sterilize the intervention through an open market 
operation, thereby no change in money supply and liquidity happening.  
 
3. Concluding Remarks 
This paper aims at providing empirical evidence on the effect of capital flows on asset prices 
including its channel under different currency regimes, focusing on ten emerging and developing 
economies in the world with data availability and stationarity for the 2000s, by a generalized 
impulse response analysis under a vector auto-regression model. The main findings are as 
follows. Portfolio capital inflows have a significantly positive effect on stock prices in all sample 
economies except two transition economies, which implies that the direct channel from capital 
inflows into stock markets is at least working in sample economies regardless of their currency 
regimes; The indirect channel –the channel in which capital inflows raise share prices through an 
increase in domestic monetary base– works differently under different currency regimes: it 
works in the economies with peg regime through their intervention to foreign exchange markets, 
whereas the indirect channel seems to be shut down in those with floating regime probably by 
sterilizing the intervention. 
With respect to the policy implications of these findings, the difference in responses of 
economic variables to capital inflows shocks under different currency regimes affects the policy 
options among macroeconomic policy, prudential policy and capital controls. Under floating 
regime, the sterilization of capital inflows as a macroeconomic policy can be one of the key 
options as Caballero and Krishnamurthy (2006) suggested in the context of risk management. 
Under peg regime without the sterilization instrument, the heavier burdens might be imposed on 
domestic prudential measures to avoid boom-bust cycle under massive capital inflows. 
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Diagram 1 Two Channels from Capital Flows and Asset Prices 
 
 
 
Diagram 2 Two Channels under Mundell-Fleming Framework 
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Table 1 Selection of Sample Economies 
 
Source: IFS. 
  
Countries Data Availability Currency Regime Data Stationarity
Argentina Available Mixed
Brazil Available Float Yes
Bulgaria Available Peg No
Chile Available Float Yes
Colombia Available Float Yes
Croatia Available Peg Yes
Hungary Available Mixed
India Available Peg Yes
Indonesia Available Float Yes
Latvia Available Mixed
Lithuania Available Mixed
Malaysia Available Mixed
Mauritius Available Peg No
Mexico Available Float Yes
Morocco Available Mixed
Peru Available Peg Yes
Philippines Available Mixed
Poland Available Float No
Russia Available Peg Yes
South Africa Available Float No
Thailand Available Float Yes
Turkey Available Mixed
Ukraine Available Peg No
Note: The data are not available in Afghanistan, Albania, Algeria, Angola, Anguilla, Antigua and Barbuda,
Armenia, Aruba, Azerbaijan, Bahamas, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Barbados, Belarus, Belize, Benin, Bhutan, Bolivia,
Bosnia and Herzegovina, Botswana, Brunei Darussalam, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cambodia, Cameroon, Cape
Verde, Central Africa, Chad, China, Comoros, Congo, Dem. Rep. of, Congo, Rep. of, Costa Rica, Cote d'Ivoire,
Curacao & Sint Maarten, Djibouti, Dominica, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, Equatorial
Guinea, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Fiji, Gabon, Gambia, Georgia, Ghana, Grenada, Guatemala, Guinea, Guinea Bissau,
Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, Iran, Iraq, Jamaica, Jordan, Kazakhstan, Kenya, Kosovo, Kuwait, Kyrgyz, Lao,
Lebanon, Lesotho, Liberia, Libya, Macedonia, Madagascar, Malawi, Maldives, Mali, Mauritania, Micronesia,
Moldova, Mongolia, Montenegro, Montserrat, Mozambique, Myanmar, Namibia, Nepal, Netherlands Antilles,
Nicaragua, Niger, Nigeria, Oman, Pakistan, Panama, Papua New Guinea, Paraguay, Qatar, Romania, Rwanda,
Samoa, Sao TomE & Prucipe, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Serbia, Seychelles, Sierra Leone, Slovak Republic,
Solomon Islands, Somalia, Sri Lanka, St. Kitts and Nevis, St. Lucia, St. Vincent & Grenadines, Sudan,
Suriname, Swaziland, Syria, Tajikistan, Tanzania, Timor-Leste, Togo, Tonga, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia,
Uganda, United Arab Emirates, Uruguay, Vanuatu, Venezuela, Vietnam, West Bank and Gaza, Yemen Arab
Rep., Yemen, P.D. Rep., Yemen, Republic of, Yugoslavia, Zambia, and Zimbabwe.
15 
 
Table 2 Currency Regimes 
 
Source: IFS. 
  
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
Argentina 1 1 5 3 3 3 3 2 2 2 2 Mixed
Brazil 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 Float
Bulgaria 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 Peg
Chile 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 Float
Colombia 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 Float
Croatia 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 Peg
Hungary 2 2 2 2 2 3 3 3 3 3 3 Mixed
India 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 Peg
Indonesia 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 Float
Latvia 3 3 2 2 2 2 3 3 3 3 1 Mixed
Lithuania 1 1 1 1 3 2 2 1 1 2 2 Mixed
Malaysia 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 3 3 3 Mixed
Mauritius 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 Peg
Mexico 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 Float
Morocco 2 2 2 2 2 1 1 1 1 1 1 Mixed
Peru 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 Peg
Philippines 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 3 3 3 Mixed
Poland 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 Float
Russia 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 3 Peg
South Africa 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 Float
Thailand 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 Float
Turkey 3 5 5 4 4 4 4 4 3 3 3 Mixed
Ukraine 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 Peg
Note
1: No separate legal tender;
    Pre announced peg or currency board arrangement;
    Pre announced horizontal band that is narrower than or equal to +/-2%
    De facto peg
2: Pre announced crawling peg
    Pre announced crawling band that is narrower than or equal to +/-2%
    De factor crawling peg
    De facto crawling band that is narrower than or equal to +/-2%
3: Pre announced crawling band that is wider than or equal to +/-2%
    De facto crawling band that is narrower than or equal to +/-5%
    Moving band that is narrower than or equal to +/-2% (i.e., allows for
    both appreciation and depreciation over time)
    Managed floating
4: Freely floating
5: Freely falling
Source: http://www.carmenreinhart.com/data/browse-by-topic/topics/11/
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Table 3 Outcomes of Ng and Perron Test 
 
Note: ∗∗∗, ∗∗, and ∗ indicate rejection of the null of a unit root at the 1 percent, 5 percent, and 10 percent 
significance levels with critical values. 
Source: IFS. 
  
MZa MZt MSB MPT MZa MZt MSB MPT
PFN -21.38** -3.26** 0.15** 4.30** -19.55** -3.12** 0.15** 4.66**
STP -14.86* -2.69* 0.18 6.31* -23.22** -3.40** 0.14** 3.92***
MOB -3.60 -1.11 0.31 21.87 -20.22** -3.15** 0.15** 4.63**
PFN -10.56 -2.29 0.21 8.65 -11.22 -2.36 0.21 8.11
STP -7.26 -1.80 0.24 12.70 -16.29* -2.85* 0.17* 5.59*
MOB -3.93 -1.09 0.27 19.66 -20.76** -3.15** 0.15** 4.77**
PFN -24.21*** -3.46*** 0.14** 3.83*** -38.14*** -4.35*** 0.11*** 2.42***
STP -11.79 -2.42 0.20 7.73 -23.53** -3.42*** 0.14** 3.88***
MOB -3.52 -1.32 0.37 25.86 -24.53*** -3.49*** 0.14*** 3.76***
PFN -24.44*** -3.48*** 0.14*** 3.82*** -39.82*** -4.45*** 0.11*** 2.34***
STP -7.37 -1.91 0.25 12.37 -24.73*** -3.51*** 0.14*** 3.68***
MOB -14.43* -2.64* 0.18* 6.57* -18.79** -3.06** 0.16** 4.87**
PFN -24.86*** -3.52*** 0.14*** 3.67*** -18.94** -3.00** 0.15** 5.27**
STP -9.49 -2.12 0.22 9.80 -19.57** -3.12** 0.15** 4.67**
MOB -2.50 -1.09 0.40 31.41 -21.14** -3.24** 0.15** 4.33**
PFN -13.96 -2.59 0.18 6.81 -76.10*** -6.15*** 0.08*** 1.24***
STP -13.73 -2.56 0.18 6.95 -18.55** -3.03** 0.16** 4.97**
MOB -8.60 -2.06 0.24 10.61 -20.41** -3.19** 0.15** 4.46**
PFN -21.97** -3.27** 0.14** 4.38** -21.18** -3.23** 0.15** 4.40**
STP -10.45 -2.19 0.20 0.16 -22.38** -3.34** 0.14** 4.07**
MOB -15.45* -2.73** 0.17* 6.14* -19.26** -3.09** 0.16** 4.78**
PFN -19.28** -3.08** 0.16** 4.83** -15.12* -2.53 0.16** 7.24
STP -10.16 -2.20 0.21 9.18 -55.06*** -5.24*** 0.09*** 1.68***
MOB -9.66 -2.07 0.21 9.94 -17.59** 2.94** 0.16** 5.28**
PFN -24.63*** -3.46*** 0.14*** 3.95*** -1191*** -24.40*** 0.02*** 0.07***
STP -16.54* -2.84* 0.17* 5.69* -20.20** -3.17** 0.15** 4.51**
MOB -6.82 -1.83 0.26 13.36 -20.19** -3.17** 0.15** 4.52**
PFN -24.38*** -3.48*** 0.14*** 3.78*** -21.05** -3.21** 0.15** 4.50**
STP -20.60** -3.20** 0.15** 4.42** -42.32*** -4.59*** 0.10*** 2.16***
MOB 0.23 0.06 0.29 30.25 -35.11*** -3.96*** 0.11*** 3.79***
PFN -22.80** -3.36** 0.14** 4.04** -21.27** -3.26** 0.15** 4.28**
STP -15.72* -2.79* 0.17* 5.82* -17.38** -2.93** 0.16* 5.31**
MOB -4.82 -1.51 0.31 18.65 -11.96 -2.43 0.20 7.65
PFN -24.60*** -3.50*** 0.14*** 3.72*** -21.60** -3.28** 0.15** 4.22**
STP -14.53* -2.66* 0.18* 6.46* -21.94** -3.31** 0.15** 4.15**
MOB -8.80 -2.01 0.22 10.63 -22.93** -3.38** 0.14** 4.00***
PFN -23.57** -3.43*** 0.14** 3.86*** -21.18** -3.25** 0.15** 4.30**
STP -12.73 -2.51 0.19 7.20 -12.52 -2.49 0.19 7.30
MOB -7.17 -1.88 0.26 12.70 -17.32** -2.93** 0.16* 5.32**
PFN -20.36** -3.18** 0.15** 4.48** -19.33** -3.10** 0.16** 4.71**
STP -24.15*** -3.41** 0.14*** 4.11** -19.19** -3.06** 0.15** 4.96**
MOB -7.44 -1.88 0.25 12.32 -19.67** -3.13** 0.15** 4.63**
PFN -7.66 -1.93 0.25 11.95 -1.85 -0.88 0.47 43.59
STP -35.83*** -4.15*** 0.11*** 2.99*** -33.87*** -4.11*** 0.12*** 2.70***
MOB -9.49 -2.04 0.21 10.15 -18.22** -2.96** 0.16** 5.31**
Thailand
Ukraine
Indonesia
Mauritius
Mexico
Peru
Level First Difference
Poland
Russia
South Africa
Brazil
Bulgaria
Chile
Colombia
Croatia
India
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Figure 1Overview on Sample Economies 
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Source: IFS. 
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Table 4 Generalized Impulse Responses to Capital Inflow Shock 
 
Note: 
1) ∗∗∗, ∗∗, and ∗ indicate rejection of the null hypothesis at the 1 percent, 5 percent, and 10 percent 
significance levels. 
2) Money multiplier denotes “Broad Money” divided by monetary base. 
Source: IFS. 
  
Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4
[Floating Economies]
10.491*** 15.754*** 15.563** 13.108** -0.009 0.066 0.714 0.684
(3.104) (5.407) (6.732) (6.331) (0.462) (0.860) (1.253) (1.532)
3.420** 3.395 1.932 3.114 -0.972 -1.473 -3.901 -2.452
(1.475) (2.635) (3.498) (3.563) (1.016) (1.604) (2.091) (2.080)
1.849 6.902* 5.162 3.029 -0.079 -0.195 -0.155 -0.080
(2.650) (4.052) (4.640) (4.286) (0.132) (0.146) (0.166) (0.132)
5.968** 10.059* 11.515 8.272 0.433 0.179 1.005** 0.582
(3.001) (5.991) (8.580) (9.075) (0.349) (0.392) (0.437) (0.367)
8.391*** 13.228*** 12.900** 10.448* -0.141 -0.333 -0.395 -0.339
(2.146) (2.765) (2.688) (2.190) (0.082) (0.130) (0.168) (0.171)
3.193** 6.042** 5.674* 4.553 -0.358 -0.412 -0.541 -0.413
(1.315) (2.540) (3.249) (3.138) (0.181) (0.218) (0.244) (0.209)
[Pegged Economies]
12.974*** 19.690*** 22.769*** 22.676*** 0.511** 0.561* 0.662 1.133***
(2.656) (4.835) (7.035) (8.227) (0.258) (0.320) (0.412) (0.438)
11.413** 25.835*** 26.850** 9.672 0.368*** 0.450** 0.655** 0.604**
(5.272) (9.821) (12.805) (13.931) (0.132) (0.197) (0.262) (0.290)
-0.252 1.240 3.944 4.198 0.400 0.149 0.652 0.318
(3.160) (5.868) (7.995) (8.724) (0.519) (0.748) (0.925) (0.860)
4.417 2.242 5.393 5.200 0.446 0.180 0.139 0.298
(3.593) (6.658) (8.562) (8.532) (0.628) (0.899) (0.940) (0.730)
Chile 14.67
STP MOB Money
Multiplier
Brazil 7.45
Colombia 5.53
Indonesia 4.94
Mexico 12.81
Croatia 3.45
Russia 2.61
Thailand 11.00
India 4.81
Peru 6.03
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Appendix VAR Model Estimation  
 
Note: ∗∗∗, ∗∗, and ∗ indicate rejection of the null hypothesis at the 1 percent, 5 percent, and 10 percent 
significance levels. 
Source: IFS. 
 
D(PFN-1) D(PFN-2) D(STP-1) D(STP-2) D(MOB-1) D(MOB-2) C adj. R^2
D(PFN) -0.424** -0.090 0.039 -0.070** -0.026 0.133 0.424 0.151
D(STP) 0.404 0.323 0.408* -0.265 -0.999 0.846 5.365 0.010
D(MOB) -0.321 0.250 0.081** -0.057* 0.381** 0.402** 0.119 0.346
D(PFN) -0.854*** -0.309 0.036 0.011 -0.040 0.122 0.597 0.378
D(STP) -0.329 -0.620 0.455** 0.030 0.016 -0.122 2.946* 0.082
D(MOB) -0.036 -0.498* -0.045 0.005 0.177 0.133 0.241 0.036
D(PFN) -0.547*** -0.549*** 0.002 0.009 -0.281 0.225 0.223 0.351
D(STP) 1.365** 0.092 0.190 -0.057 1.427 1.985 4.575 0.008
D(MOB) -0.038 -0.014 -0.005 0.005 -0.363* 0.082 0.386** 0.081
D(PFN) -0.350* -0.311* 0.011 -0.002 -0.197 0.316 0.041 0.179
D(STP) 0.933 -0.166 0.686*** -0.131 -4.902*** -1.559 2.356 0.348
D(MOB) -0.012 0.234 0.010 0.044 -0.665*** -0.452** -0.801** 0.327
D(PFN) -0.841*** -0.392** 0.069 -0.127* 1.205 0.427 0.487 0.305
D(STP) 0.050 0.005 0.634*** -0.182 5.009 5.380 2.271 0.173
D(MOB) -0.029 -0.023 -0.007 -0.000 0.012 0.119 0.162 0.017
D(PFN) -0.446*** -0.255* 0.178** -0.166** 1.541*** 0.448 -0.188 0.385
D(STP) 0.506 -0.248 0.630*** -0.269 2.553** -1.286 1.339 0.279
D(MOB) -0.018 -0.019 -0.037 0.012 -0.360** 0.120 0.223 0.044
D(PFN) -0.188 -0.165 -0.016 -0.015 -0.042 -0.304* 0.154 0.178
D(STP) 2.330 1.000 0.256 0.153 0.523 -1.667 1.595 0.016
D(MOB) -0.139 -0.327 0.041* 0.025 -0.588*** -0.200 0.267 0.191
D(PFN) -0.575*** -0.415** 0.012 -0.018 -0.299 -1.957** 0.994 0.288
D(STP) 2.657** 2.567* 0.577*** -0.361** -8.969 -18.694** 16.945*** 0.459
D(MOB) 0.023 0.049 -0.004 0.004 0.107 0.167 0.318* -0.033
D(PFN) -0.648*** -0.205 0.026 -0.063 0.152 0.010 0.017 0.196
D(STP) 0.053 0.427 0.250 0.087 2.977** 1.023 -2.207 0.261
D(MOB) -0.036 0.035 -0.018 0.009 -0.019 0.316 0.346 -0.069
D(PFN) -0.713*** -0.231 0.002 -0.026 0.169 0.188 0.043 0.265
D(STP) -1.800 0.534 0.555*** -0.278 -0.298 2.857** 2.388 0.198
D(MOB) -0.136 -0.106 0.017 0.018 -0.051 -0.146 0.672 -0.144
India
Peru
Croatia
Russia
Brazil
Chile
Colombia
Indonesia
Mexico
Thailand
